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On November 13, 2014, ministers across the United States were able 
to breathe a collective sigh of relief.1  On that day the Seventh Circuit 
vacated a lower court judgment that held that tax exclusions granted 
exclusively to “ministers of the gospel” violated the Establishment 
Clause and were therefore unconstitutional.2  The Seventh Circuit 
declined to rule on whether the tax exclusions for ministers violated the 
Establishment Clause; instead, Circuit Judge Joel Martin Flaum, writing 
for a three-judge panel, held only that the plaintiffs in the case lacked 
standing to challenge the tax provisions.3 
Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code contains two provisions 
that allow “ministers of the gospel” to deduct from their income the 
rental or mortgage value of a home as well as the cost of utilities and 
maintenance for the home.4  Section 107(1) (hereinafter the Parsonage 
Allowance) allows ministers to deduct from their income the value of a 
house provided to the minister by the church or religious organization.5  
Section 107(2) (hereinafter the Minister’s Housing Allowance) allows 
ministers who are not provided a home by their church or religious 
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organization to deduct from their income the value of a home purchased 
or rented by the minister.6  The plain text of the tax code explicitly states 
that this exemption applies only to “ministers of the gospel.”7 
Just one year before the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, Judge Barbara 
Crabb for the Western District of Wisconsin held in Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Lew (Lew) that tax exclusions granted 
exclusively to “ministers of the gospel” violated the Establishment 
Clause.8  In Lew, Judge Crabb ultimately determined that since the 
exemption explicitly applied to only religious persons and not other 
similarly situated individuals, the exemption was unconstitutional.9  The 
Seventh Circuit, however, vacated the district court judgment and held 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they never actually applied for 
the tax exemption, were never denied the tax exemption, and therefore 
suffered no actual injury from the tax exemption.10  As of April 2015, the 
plaintiffs in Lew were considering whether to appeal their case to the 
Supreme Court.11 
The district court’s decision in Lew was covered by many news 
sources, including the Huffington Post.12  The Wisconsin State Journal 
called the judgment a “stunning court victory” for the Freedom from 
Religion Foundation (FFRF).13  Commenting on the article published by 
the Wisconsin State Journal, the Christian Legal Society stated, “[i]f this 
section (of the tax code) were invalidated, the consequences for retired 
ministers could run the gamut from reduced standard of living to true 
want.”14  Clergy TaxNet, a clergy tax advice blog, stated that the ruling 
would have “an enormous impact on clergy around the country.”15 
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One report, published in 2002, estimated that ministers would save 
$2.3 billion in taxes through the exemption between the years 2002 and 
2007.16  Some reports estimate the tax exclusion is worth $700 million a 
year.17  According to another report, about 87% of ministers claim the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance.18 
This Comment has three primary components.  Part II of this 
Comment will examine the history of the Minister’s Housing Allowance.  
Part III will examine the issue of standing and the difficulties of 
establishing standing to challenge tax provisions.  Part IV will show 
how, regardless of standing, the Minister’s Housing Allowance violates 
the Establishment Clause because: (1) it does not have a secular purpose; 
(2) it can be reasonably seen as a government endorsement of religion; 
(3) it fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion; 
(4) it is not rooted in an historical tradition; and (5) it violates 
government neutrality with religion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Before discussing the standing and Establishment Clause issues, it is 
important to understand the substance of the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance as well as its history.  This requires a brief look at the Internal 
Revenue Code and some tax provisions.  It also requires a discussion of 
religious tax exemptions going back to colonial America. 
A. Understanding the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
The Parsonage Exemption and Minister’s Housing Allowance are 
codified in 26 U.S.C. § 107: 
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include 
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his 
compensation; or  (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his 
compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and 
to the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the 
                                                          
 16.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d, 1051, 1054 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 17.  Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Are Pastors’ Homes that Different?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (June 
24, 2014), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/june/are-pastors-homes-that-different.html. 
 18.  Id. 
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home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus 
the cost of utilities.19 
It is important to distinguish between the two sections.  Section 
107(1) allows ministers to exclude from their income a house provided 
by their church or religious employer.  This is similar to Internal 
Revenue Code § 119, which provides similar tax exclusions for secular 
employees who are provided residence as part of their compensation.20  
A major rationale for the Parsonage Exemption is that the provision of 
the house by the employer or the church is for the convenience of the 
employer—this is also known as the “Convenience of the Employer 
Doctrine.”21 
The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine describes a tax exclusion 
for employees who are required to live on the business premises as a 
condition of their employment.22  Therefore, the provision of the house is 
not for the benefit of the employee, but rather the benefit is for the 
convenience of the employer.23  An example would be a hotel manager 
who is required to live at the hotel in order to properly carry out his 
duties as a manager.24  It is not the hotel manager who is receiving the 
benefit; rather, it is the hotel owners who are receiving the benefit of 
having the manager available on the premises at all times.  The rationale 
is the same under the Parsonage Exemption.  In providing a home to a 
minister, the church is getting the benefit that the minister is available to 
members of the congregation outside of corporate gatherings.  Therefore, 
the employer benefits by providing access to the minister for the entire 
congregation. 
 Section 107(2) is different from section 107(1) in that the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance is an exemption for the rentals or payments made on 
a house that is not provided for by the religious organization.25  Put 
simply, the Parsonage Exemption excludes the home itself from gross 
income, while the Minister’s Housing Allowance excludes the income 
spent on the rental or payments for a home.26  The tax exclusion also 
extends to the cost of utilities spent on the home (such as gas, electric, 
                                                          
 19.  26 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
 20.  Id. § 119. 
 21.  Id. § 119(a). 
 22.  J. MARTIN BURKE ET AL., TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 210 (10th ed. 2012). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  26 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
 26.  Id. 
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and water bills) as well as to repairs made to the home, so long as the 
repairs do not exceed the fair market value of the home.27 
 In summary, the Parsonage Exemption allows a minister to exclude 
from his gross income the value of the house given to him by his 
religious employer.28  The Minister’s Housing Allowance allows a 
minister to exclude from gross income the rent and payments made for a 
house not provided by his employer.29  Under the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance, the minister may also exclude from gross income the cost of 
utilities and repairs or improvements to the home.30 
B. The History of the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
Religious tax exemptions for persons and entities have a long history 
in America.31  In their book Politics, Taxes, and the Pulpit, Nina Crimm 
and Laurence Winer write that tax exemptions for priests and other 
classes of people based on religion were a part of some colonial charters 
as far back as the mid-seventeenth century.32  Although some religious 
tax exemptions under state laws may be traced back to colonial times, the 
Parsonage Exemption was not codified in federal law until the Revenue 
Act of 1921.33  The original exemption only applied to housing that was 
provided by a church; therefore, ministers who were not provided 
housing could not exclude from their income the value of their housing.34 
In 1954, Congress revised the statute and added § 107(2), which 
created the Minister’s Housing Allowance.35  The date of this 
amendment is significant.  In 1954, the United States was in between the 
Korean War and the early years of the Vietnam War and was concerned 
with the spread of communism.36  In the same year the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance was codified, the words “under God” were also 
                                                          
 27.  Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (2014). 
 28.  26 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 29.  Id. § 107(2). 
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 31.  NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE 
FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 30 (2011). 
 32.  Id. 
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44 VAND. L. REV. 149, 151 (1991). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1067 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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added to pledge of allegiance.37  The purpose of amending the pledge of 
allegiance “was to ‘acknowledge the dependence of [the American] 
people and . . . Government upon the moral directions of the Creator’ 
while simultaneously ‘deny[ing] the atheistic and materialistic concepts 
of communism.’”38  Considering the context of the threat of communism, 
it is important to note the comments of Representative Peter Mack, a 
congressman from Illinois.39 
Representative Mack was the sponsor for the 1954 law, which 
codified the Minister’s Housing Allowance.40  Speaking before the 
House Committee on Ways & Means in 1953, Representative Mack 
stated the following in support of the Minister’s Housing Allowance: 
Certainly, in these times when we are being threatened by a godless 
and anti-religious world movement we should correct this 
discrimination against certain ministers of the gospel who are carrying 
on such a courageous fight against this.  Certainly this is not too much 
to do for these people who are caring for our spiritual welfare.41 
Representative Mack’s statements that “we should correct this 
discrimination against certain ministers” can be explained by another 
comment from a House committee report from 1954: 
Under present law, the rental value of a home furnished a minister of 
the gospel as a part of his salary is not included in his gross income.  
This is unfair to those ministers who are not furnished a parsonage, but 
who receive larger salaries (which are taxable) to compensate them for 
expenses they incur in supplying their own home.  Your committee has 
removed the discrimination in existing law by providing that the 
present exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to ministers to 
the extent used by them to rent or provide a home.42 
The legislative history gives two reasons for the creation of the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance.  The first reason proposed to cure a 
                                                          
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 1–2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 
2340). 
 39.  Wes Smith, Peter F. Mack Jr., Congressman in the ‘50s, CHI. TRIB. (July 7, 1986), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-07-07/news/8602180025_1_mr-mack-naval-reserve-federal-
aviation-act. 
 40.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1068 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before 
the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 83rd Cong. 1574–75 (1953) (statement of Peter F. Mack, Jr.)). 
 41.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 42.  Id. at 1067 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 15 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4035, 4040). 
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defect that minister’s then receiving the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
were no longer discriminated against simply because their church did not 
provide them with a parsonage.43  The second reason proposed that 
ministers who were “carrying on the fight” against “a godless and anti-
religious world movement” were rewarded for their efforts in caring for 
America’s “spiritual welfare.”44 
Following passage in 1954, the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
remained largely unchanged until 2002.  In 2002 the House of 
Representatives passed the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act 
of 2002.45  The Act was passed in response to a case involving a pastor in 
California before the Ninth Circuit.46  In Warren v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue,47 a minister had claimed approximately $80,000 in tax-
exempt housing allowance income.48  To prevent abuses of the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance, § 107(2) was amended to include the words “fair 
market value.”49  The Internal Revenue Service also ruled that a rental 
allowance may only be used for one home and could not be used to 
support a second home.50  
C. Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Lew 
The FFRF is a non-profit organization whose purpose is to “promote 
the constitutional principle of separation of state and church, and to 
educate the public on matters relating to nontheism.”51  Two co-
presidents of the FFRF, Annie Laurie Gaylor and Dan Barker, 
individually along with the FFRF,52 brought a lawsuit in the Western 
District of Wisconsin alleging that both the Parsonage Exemption and the 
                                                          
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 1068 (quoting General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the H. Comm. On Ways 
and Means, 83rd Cong. 1574–75 (1953)). 
 45.  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and 
Should be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 708 (2003). 
 46.  Id.; see also Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 47.  Warren, 282 F.3d at 1119. 
 48.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 708.  It is important to note that the $80,000 claimed by 
this minister was not the entire value of his home.  Rather, this was the money he spent on the rent or 
mortgage, along with utilities in one taxable year.  The tax code only allows exclusions for the 
taxable year of income spent on the home.  See 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 49.  Id. § 107(2) (2012). 
 50.  Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (2014). 
 51.  FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, http://ffr.org/faq/item/14999-what-is-the-found 
ations-purpose (last visited May 24, 2015). 
 52.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d, 1051, 1052 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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Minister’s Housing Allowance violated the Establishment Clause.53  
Specifically, the FFRF claimed unequal treatment because only 
“ministers of the gospel” were able to claim the tax exclusion even 
though portions of Barker and Gaylor’s salaries from the FFRF were 
designated as a housing allowance.54 
The suit was brought against the Secretary of the Department of the 
Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service.55  
Originally, the FFRF challenged both the Parsonage Exemption and the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance.56  Defendants filed for summary 
judgment, and the FFRF did not oppose defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment as to the Parsonage Exemption issue.57  The district court 
granted defendant’s motion for the Parsonage Exemption, but the court 
entered summary judgment sua sponte for the FFRF on their claim 
against the Minister’s Housing Allowance.58 
In its opinion, the court first addressed defendants’ argument that the 
FFRF lacked standing to challenge the Minister’s Housing Allowance.59  
The court concluded that FFRF had standing because they were injured 
by having been denied an exemption that others receive, their injury was 
fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendants in their capacity for 
implementing the tax code, and their injury was redressable by enjoining 
further enforcement of § 107(2).60 
The court next moved to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim.61  The court 
ultimately ruled that the Minister’s Housing Allowance violated the 
Establishment Clause because it did not have a secular purpose and had 
the effect of government endorsement of religion.62  The court, relying 
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,63 
ultimately held that the exception violated the Establishment Clause 
“because the exemption provides a benefit to religious persons and no 
one else, even though doing so is not necessary to alleviate a special 
burden on religious exercise.”64  In Texas Monthly, a plurality of the 
                                                          
 53.  Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. 
 54.  Id. at 1055. 
 55.  Id. at 1053. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 1054. 
 60.  Id. at 1059. 
 61.  Id. at 1060. 
 62.  Id. at 1071. 
 63.  489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). 
 64.  Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 
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Supreme Court ruled that tax exemptions granted exclusively to religious 
publications violated the Establishment Clause because they were 
available only to religious publications and not other, non-religious 
publications.65 
Upon review of Judge Crabb’s decision in the district court, the 
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the conclusion on the issue of standing.66  
The court noted that the standing issue is particularly rigorous and 
“elusive” in Establishment Clause cases.67  Circuit Judge Flaum 
highlighted three ways that a plaintiff can demonstrate standing in an 
Establishment Clause case.68  The first is that “plaintiffs may 
demonstrate standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to be 
an establishment of religion, such as a mandatory prayer in a public 
school classroom.”69  The second way to establish standing is under the 
Flast test,70 in which a taxpayer may establish standing when a 
“congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in 
derogation of [the Establishment Clause].”71  The third way a plaintiff 
can establish standing in an Establishment Clause case is when an 
individual has “incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of 
their religion . . . such as when the availability of a tax exemption is 
conditioned on religious affiliation.”72  It was this third method relied 
upon by the FFRF in Lew.73 
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, stating, “[w]ithout a 
request, there can be no denial.”74  Since the individual plaintiffs Gaylor 
and Barker never personally asked for the exemption and were 
subsequently denied, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that they were not 
actually injured.75  “A plaintiff cannot establish standing to challenge 
such a [tax] provision without having personally claimed and been 
denied the exemption.”76 
                                                          
 65.  Bullock, 489 U.S. at 5. 
 66.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 67.  Id. at 819. 
 68.  Id. at 819–21. 
 69.  Id. at 820 (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 
(2011)). 
 70.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 71.  Lew, 773 F.3d at 820 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968)). 
 72.  Id. (quoting Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1440) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73.  Id. at 821. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 822. 
 76.  Id. at 821. 
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The Seventh Circuit further rejected the FFRF’s argument that 
plaintiffs had standing because they were “similarly situated” individuals 
to “ministers of the gospel.”77  The court said that the plaintiffs still 
failed to show a legally cognizable injury, they had not actually claimed 
the exemption, and the term “similarly situated” was too vague to 
demonstrate standing.78 
Judge Crabb, in her district court opinion, wrote that requiring the 
plaintiffs to actually apply for the exemption and be denied would “serve 
no legitimate purpose” because the plaintiffs were not “ministers of the 
gospel” and the “alleged injury is clear from the face of the statute.”79  
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument.80  Circuit Judge Flaum 
wrote, “[i]n any case, ‘[t]he assumption that if [the plaintiffs] have no 
standing to sue, no one would have standing is not a reason to find 
standing.’”81  Judge Flaum explained that  “Article III ‘is not merely a 
troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the ‘merits’ 
of a lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the 
basic charter promulgated by the Framers.’”82 
Circuit Judge Flaum concluded by saying, “[a] person suffers no 
judicially cognizable injury merely because others receive a tax benefit 
that is conditioned on allegedly unconstitutional criteria, even if that 
person is otherwise ‘similarly situated’ to those who do receive the 
benefit.”83  Therefore, it did not matter whether the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance violates the Constitution—it only mattered that the plaintiffs 
had not applied for and been denied the exemption.84  As stated above, 
Circuit Judge Flaum declined to discuss in any detail the merits of the 
FFRF’s claim.85 
As of early 2015, the plaintiffs in Lew were deciding whether or not 
they would petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.86  The plaintiffs 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 823. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055–56 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 80.  Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 81.  Id. at 824 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 
(1974)). 
 82.  Id. at 825 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 (1982)). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 818. 
 86.  Telephone Interview with Rebekah Markert, Legal Counsel, Freedom from Religion 
Foundation (Feb. 6, 2015). 
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were considering two options.87  The first option was to claim the 
exemption and see if they were denied.88  The second option was to 
petition for certiorari; however, if the plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari, 
they would only be arguing their standing issue before the Supreme 
Court and not the merits of their claim regarding the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance.89 
D. The Significance of the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
In nearly every town in every state throughout the country, there are 
ministers who are claiming the Minister’s Housing Allowance.90  For 
small towns and rural communities, the ministers may have very meager 
salaries and the Allowance allows them to keep working in ministry.  
Often, the minister’s house is viewed as an extension of the church 
building itself, and many of these ministers provide counseling and 
public interest work free of charge to the community at their homes.91  
Eliminating the Allowance would mean that ministers’ taxable gross 
income would increase and ministers would have to pay higher taxes.  
Presumably, some ministers may have to leave their congregations if the 
churches or institutions are not able to supplement the minister’s salary. 
On the other hand, every taxpayer in the United States is bearing the 
tax burden created by the Minister’s Housing Allowance.  Even though it 
may be a small burden when distributed across the millions of taxpayers, 
it is a burden nonetheless on every taxpayer.  Eliminating the Allowance 
would increase the government’s tax revenue, and these resources could 
be allocated for the general welfare.  Some estimates indicate that $700 
million annually would be added to the tax revenue by eliminating the 
Allowance.92 
In sum, the Minister’s Housing Allowance matters.  It matters to 
every minister, it matters to every taxpayer, and it matters to the general 
public.  Fortunately, however, there are other options available to 
Congress if the Minister’s Housing Allowance is indeed in conflict with 
                                                          
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Are Pastors’ Homes that Different?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY 
(June 24, 2014), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/june/are-pastors-homes-that-differe 
nt.html (explaining that approximately 87% of ministers claim the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
while only 11% claim the Parsonage Exemption). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
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the Establishment Clause.  If Congress created a corresponding tax 
provision that applied to non-religious non-profits, the Allowance could 
then benefit more people in more ways.  Other non-profits could be more 
competitive in attracting top-tier managers and employees because of the 
tax exclusion.  These non-profits could also save some money that would 
have otherwise been spent supplementing salaries, and instead spend 
such money on programs and resources that directly benefit the general 
public. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Issue of Standing 
This Comment, just as in the Lew case, will examine standing before 
examining whether the Minister’s Housing Allowance violates the 
Establishment Clause.  While the purpose of this Comment is to show 
that the Minister’s Housing Allowance cannot pass any Establishment 
Clause test the Supreme Court has developed, a discussion and 
understanding of the issue of standing is essential to understanding Lew.  
Even though the Minister’s Housing Allowance appears to violate the 
Establishment Clause on its face, the Allowance has never been 
successfully challenged.  The Allowance has never been successfully 
challenged because no plaintiff has been able to overcome the significant 
hurdle of standing. 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,93 Justice Scalia set forth a three-
pronged test to determine whether a plaintiff has standing.  The plaintiff 
must show: (1) they have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury must be 
fairly traceable to the conduct or action of the defendant; and (3) the 
injury will likely be redressed by a favorable Court decision.94  Judge 
Crabb ultimately ruled in Lew that the FFRF had standing to challenge 
the Minister’s Housing Allowance.95  However, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed on the issue of standing.96 
                                                          
 93.  504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 94.  Id. at 560–61. 
 95.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 96.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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1. The History of Taxpayer Standing and the Establishment Clause 
“Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the 
proper party to bring a matter to the court . . . .”97  The issue becomes 
more complicated when the person bringing the claim is a taxpayer 
seeking a remedy for a tax provision that the taxpayer claims has injured 
him.98 
In 1923, the Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. Mellon99 that a 
taxpayer could not establish standing simply by claiming an “interest in 
the moneys of the treasury” because the moneys of the treasury are 
“shared with millions of others, [and the taxpayer’s interest] is 
comparatively minute and indeterminable.”100  In essence, the Court was 
saying that a taxpayer cannot get standing simply by being a taxpayer 
because the “injury” that the taxpayer receives is so minute and spread 
out over the millions of taxpayers who are also “injured.”101 
This more difficult and complicated standing test was successfully 
met once, in the 1968 Supreme Court case Flast v. Cohen.102  In Flast, 
the Court recognized a taxpayer’s standing in an Establishment Clause 
case where federal funds were being distributed to religious schools.103  
The Court stated there was “no absolute bar in Article III to suits by 
federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing 
and spending programs.”104  However, subsequent Supreme Court cases 
have limited the scope of Flast to cases where the government was 
exercising its spending power.105 
                                                          
 97.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 59 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 98.  See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (discussing the difficulty in determining 
whether a taxpayer has enough personal stake in the outcome of a tax provision to establish 
standing). 
 99.  262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 100.  Id. at 487. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  392 U.S. at 103. 
 103.  Id. at 85, 103 (putting in cite for the fact federal funds being distributed to religious 
schools). 
 104.  Id. at 101. 
 105.  See infra Part III.A.2; see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 
1447 (2011) (explaining that tax expenditures are not actually government spending under the tax 
and spend power); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 608 (2007) 
(distinguishing between executive spending from President’s discretionary fund and general 
government spending). 
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2. Applying Flast to the Facts in Lew 
The Flast Court recognized that to show standing, a taxpayer must 
demonstrate a “personal stake and interest” in the case in order for the 
court to have the ability to hear the taxpayer’s case.106  The Court 
determined the taxpayer must establish a “logical nexus between the 
status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.”107  There are 
three important implications in Flast.  First, Flast limits taxpayer 
standing to challenges that claim a federal tax is unconstitutional.108  
Secondly, Flast requires a relationship between the taxpayer and the 
alleged unconstitutional tax.109  And third, the taxpayer must show a 
relationship between himself and the precise reason why the tax is 
unconstitutional.110  The Flast Court found this nexus because the taxing 
and spending power was being used “to favor one religion over another 
or to support religion in general.”111 
As noted above, courts have continued to follow Flast in limiting the 
scope of taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause.112  Taxpayer 
standing is limited to Establishment Clause cases that challenge the 
spending power of Congress.113  Thus, an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a tax credit does not have standing because it is not an 
exercise of government spending.114 
The difference between government spending and a tax credit can 
quickly become confusing.  Government spending can be defined as a 
“direct transfer of government (or public) revenues, generated by 
taxation, to the subsidized entity.”115  The Supreme Court has rejected 
the argument that a tax exemption is government spending.116  The 
taxpayers in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn 
argued that a “taxpayer’s entire income is government property that 
becomes his own only when the government decides not to exercise its 
                                                          
 106.  Flast, 392 U.S. at 101. 
 107.  Id. at 102. 
 108.  Id. at 101–02. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 103. 
 112.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 113.  Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 114.  Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011). 
 115.  Bryan Dearinger, The Future of Taxpayer Standing in Establishment Clause Tax Credit 
Cases, 92 OR. L. REV. 263, 296 (2013). 
 116.  See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447–48. 
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taxation power over 100% of it.”117  This argument relies on the 
assumption that tax expenditure analysis is a form of government 
spending. 
Tax expenditure analysis is the concept that the government loses 
money through tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions.118  
Therefore, the government “expends” money by allowing taxpayers to 
claim tax exemptions and tax deductions.  One example is the proposed 
theory of the taxpayers in Winn.119  The theory is that the government 
owns 100% of a taxpayer’s earnings and income.  The government is 
entitled to all of that money, and when it allows the taxpayer to keep that 
money through a tax exclusion, tax deduction, or tax credit, the 
government is expending money to which it was otherwise entitled.  The 
Court in Winn rejected the argument that a tax expenditure was a form of 
government spending.120  Therefore, for the government to exercise its 
spending power the government must actually transfer actual revenue or 
funds to an entity; there is no government spending if the government 
simply refuses to collect certain taxes.121 
The reason why government spending is treated differently than tax 
credits or exclusions is a very subtle distinction.  The Court in Winn 
explained the distinction as follows: 
It is easy to see that tax credits and governmental expenditures can 
have similar economic consequences, at least for beneficiaries whose 
tax liability is sufficiently large to take full advantage of the credit.  Yet 
tax credits and governmental expenditures do not both implicate 
individual taxpayers in sectarian activities.  A dissenter whose tax 
dollars are “extracted and spent” knows that he has in some small 
measure been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of 
conscience.  In that instance the taxpayer’s direct and particular 
connection with the establishment does not depend on economic 
speculation or political conjecture.  The connection would exist even if 
the conscientious dissenter’s tax liability were unaffected or reduced.  
When the government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is no 
such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged 
establishment.  Any financial injury remains speculative.122 
                                                          
 117.  Dearinger, supra note 115, at 298. 
 118.  MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 39 (Rev. 4th ed. 2002). 
 119.  See Dearinger, supra note 115, at 296 n.154. 
 120.  Id. 
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 122.  Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011) (emphasis added) 
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In the facts of Lew, for the FFRF to have standing under the Flast 
test, the FFRF must establish a “logical nexus between the status asserted 
and the claim sought to be adjudicated.”123  The FFRF could establish 
this nexus only by (1) establishing a logical link between their status as 
taxpayers and the type of legislative enactment attacked;124 and (2) by 
establishing a nexus between that status as a taxpayer and the precise 
nature of the constitutional infringement.125 
One interpretation of the Flast test is that a taxpayer may have 
standing in an Establishment Clause case when the “taxpayer’s 
pocketbook harm implicates his conscience rights in a way that 
particularizes his personal stake as one who is compelled by the 
government to relinquish the protections afforded by the Establishment 
Clause.”126  This means that a taxpayer has to be taxed actual money, the 
government must spend the money in a way that is against the taxpayer’s 
beliefs, and that spending must violate the Constitution.127 
Under this interpretation of the Flast test, the FFRF fails to prove an 
injury in fact.  Although the tax exemptions to “ministers of the gospel” 
may violate the taxpayers’ consciences, the government is not actually 
expending any money in granting the exemption.  This is where Lew can 
be distinguished from Flast.  In Flast, federal funds were “being used to 
support religious schools in violation of the First Amendment.”128  
Unlike the federal funds in Flast, the Minister’s Housing Allowance only 
grants a tax exclusion—it does not transfer actual government funds to 
“ministers of the gospel.”129  Therefore, the FFRF fails the Flast test and 
cannot establish standing under the Establishment Clause because there 
are no government expenditures actually granted through the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance. 
3. Establishing Standing through an Equal Protection Analysis 
An alternative to taxpayer standing can be found in equal protection 
analysis.  An injury in fact in an equal protection case may be the “denial 
                                                          
 123.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
 124.  Id. at 102. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See Dearinger, supra note 115, at 285. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 277. 
 129.  The text of the Minister’s Housing Allowance states: “gross income does not include . . . .”  
26 U.S.C. 107 (2012).  Therefore, the government is not actually distributing money to the minister; 
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of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of [a] barrier, not the 
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”130  In Northeastern Florida 
Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of 
Jacksonville, the Supreme Court stated: 
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for 
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of 
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the 
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for 
the barrier in order to establish standing.131 
The Court in City of Jacksonville was not examining a tax issue, but 
its treatment of equal protection analysis in a standing issue is helpful.  
The city of Jacksonville, Florida enacted an ordinance that required 10% 
of city revenue spent on city contracts to be set aside each year for 
“Minority Business Enterprises.”132  Minority Business Enterprises were 
businesses “whose ownership was at least 51% ‘minority’ or female.”133  
A general contractors’ association whose membership consisted of many 
business owners who did not qualify as a Minority Business Enterprise 
owners brought suit against the city alleging the ordinance violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.134 
The district court granted summary judgment for the general 
contractors, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed because the plaintiffs 
lacked standing.135  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the 
plaintiffs had not shown that they would have received the city contracts 
even without the city ordinance.136  The Supreme Court reversed and 
held that plaintiffs did not have to show they would have won the city 
contracts to achieve standing, but instead that plaintiffs only needed to 
show they were denied equal protection for competing for the city 
contracts because of the barrier created by the city ordinance.137  
Contextualizing City of Jacksonville with the Lew case would mean that 
plaintiffs Barker and Gaylor would not need to show that they would 
qualify for the Minister’s Housing Allowance; rather, Barker and Gaylor 
                                                          
 130.  Ne. Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 
666 (1993). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 658. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 659. 
 135.  Id. at 660. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 666. 
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need only show that there is a significant government barrier barring 
them from obtaining the benefit. 
Using an equal protection analysis, as applied by the Supreme Court 
in City of Jacksonville, the FFRF can argue they have suffered an injury 
in fact because they are denied Equal Protection because they cannot 
claim the Minister’s Housing Allowance.  Section 107(2) certainly seems 
to be a barrier erected by the government that only allows “ministers of 
the gospel” to claim the tax exclusion.138  Whether or not the individual 
plaintiffs would qualify for the exemption is not the dispositive issue.  
Instead, the individual plaintiffs only need to show that they are denied 
the Equal Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment based on religion, 
because only those who are religious may claim the tax exclusion under 
§ 107(2). 
4. The Court’s Analysis in Lew 
Although more subtle than the Court’s application in City of 
Jacksonville, this is the analysis Judge Crabb applied in Lew, explaining 
that, “Gaylor’s and Barker’s alleged injury is the unequal treatment they 
receive under § 107(2).”139  It is important to note here that the issue was 
not that the plaintiffs are atheists; the important aspect is that as 
employees for a non-religious non-profit, they are denied equal 
protection because the exemption is only available for employees of 
religious organizations. 
The defendants in Lew argued that the FFRF lacked standing because 
they did not suffer an actual injury in fact because they did not try to 
claim the exemption from the IRS.140  Judge Crabb rejected defendants’ 
argument, declaring that “there is no plausible argument that the 
individual plaintiffs could qualify for an exemption as ‘ministers of the 
gospel,’ so it would serve no legitimate purpose to require plaintiffs to 
claim the exemption and wait for the inevitable denial of the claim.”141 
Defendants claimed that the individual plaintiffs could have qualified 
for the exemption as “ministers of the gospel” had they attempted to 
qualify for the exemption.142  Relying on a prior Seventh Circuit opinion, 
defendants argued that an atheist group could qualify as a religion under 
                                                          
 138.  26 U.S.C. 107(2) (2012). 
 139.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 140.  Id. at 1055. 
 141.  Id. at 1055–56. 
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the Constitution.143  In Kaufman v. McCaughtry, the Seventh Circuit held 
that a prisoner’s rights were violated because he was not allowed to start 
an atheist study group in prison.144 
The Kaufman court stated that “[a] religion need not be based on a 
belief in the existence of a supreme being (or beings, for polytheistic 
faiths) . . . nor must it be a mainstream faith.”145  Instead, a religion may 
be found when any person has sincerely held beliefs “dealing with issues 
of ‘ultimate concern’” that occupy “a ‘place parallel to that filled by . . . 
God in traditionally religious persons.”’146 
Relying on Kaufman, the defendants in Lew argued that the plaintiffs 
Barker and Gaylor, in their individual capacity, could qualify for the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance because their atheism could qualify them 
as practicing a religion.147  Judge Crabb rejected this argument and 
focused on whether the plaintiffs Barker and Gaylor could qualify as 
“ministers of the gospel” according to the text of the statute.148 
Courts have created a five-factor test to determine whether a person 
qualifies as a “minister of the gospel.”  A person may qualify as a 
minister of the gospel if that person: 
(1) performs sacerdotal functions under the tenets and practices of the 
particular religious body constituting his church or church 
denomination; (2) conducts worship services; (3) performs services in 
the control, conduct, and maintenance of a religious organization that 
operates under the authority of a church or church denomination; (4) is 
ordained, commissioned, or licensed; and (5) is considered to be a 
spiritual leader by his religious body.149 
Defendants in Lew argued that some actions by plaintiffs Gaylor and 
Barker met the requirements of the test.150  For example, defendants 
argued that “Barker engages in a number of activities that could be 
classified as sacerdotal, such as performing de-baptisms, lecturing, 
performing marriages, counseling, promoting free thought and writing 
free thought songs.”151  Judge Crabb found that, while some of Barker 
                                                          
 143.  Id. at 1056. 
 144.  Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 680–81 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 145.  Id. at 681. 
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and Gaylor’s actions might meet some of the criteria of a “minister of the 
gospel,” there was no evidence to prove that either of the plaintiffs could 
qualify as a “minister of the gospel.”152 
 Judge Crabb referred to defendants’ arguments as “red 
herrings.”153  Indeed, defendants’ arguments miss the point.  The FFRF 
was not challenging the validity of the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
from their beliefs as atheists; rather, the FFRF was alleging unequal tax 
treatment because they were employees of a non-profit and could not 
gain the tax exclusion because of their employee status rather than their 
religious (or lack of religious) beliefs.154 
This is a subtle, yet very important distinction.  The FFRF was not 
alleging that their injury was the violation of their beliefs as atheists, nor 
were they alleging they could not receive the tax exclusion because of 
their beliefs as atheists.  Instead, plaintiffs were arguing that the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance is unconstitutional because it grants the 
exclusion for housing allowances only for “ministers of the gospel.”155  
Gaylor and Barker’s injuries stem from the fact that both are employed at 
a non-profit organization and portions of their salaries are designated as 
housing allowances,156 yet they cannot claim the exemption because their 
work as employees does not qualify as the kind of work that qualifies 
them as “ministers of the gospel” under the statute. 
It was this unequal treatment for non-profit employees at issue—both 
in the standing issue and the merits issue—and not the atheist beliefs of 
the FFRF that were central to Judge Crabb’s finding of standing.157  The 
FFRF and individual plaintiffs had been injured by the unequal treatment 
of the tax code, their injury was traceable to the defendants who were 
tasked with implementing the tax code, and the FFRF’s injury was 
redressable by finding the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
unconstitutional and enjoining the enforcement of the Allowance.158  
Using the central idea of City of Jacksonville, Barker and Gaylor’s 
injuries stemmed from a significant barrier erected by the government 
that prevented them from obtaining the benefit.159 
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However, the Seventh Circuit rejected Judge’s Crabb’s 
conclusions.160  The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion is really quite simple— 
because the plaintiffs never claimed the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
in their personal taxes, and because they were never denied the 
exemption, the plaintiffs suffered no injury.161  Circuit Judge Flaum 
wrote, “[w]ithout a request, there can be no denial.”162 
In the opinion, the court first rejected the argument that the plaintiffs 
had standing as taxpayers because they were “similarly situated” to 
ministers.163  The court reasoned that even though the plaintiffs may be 
similarly situated to “ministers of the gospel,” since they did not claim 
the exemption, they did not suffer a legally cognizable injury.164  The 
court went further to say that the key difference between a minister and 
the plaintiffs was that the ministers actually claimed the tax exclusion, 
where the plaintiffs neglected to do so.165  Therefore, according to the 
reasoning of the court, the only thing barring the plaintiffs bringing their 
claim to court was claiming the exclusion in their taxes.166 
 The court then rejected the argument that the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance may be insulated from challenge because of the standing 
requirements.167  The court wrote, “‘[t]he assumption that if [the 
plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a 
reason to find standing.’”168 
Circuit Judge Flaum next addressed Judge Crabb’s argument that the 
plaintiffs should not have to claim the exemption because they would be 
inevitably denied.169  This issue is where Judge Flaum chose to devote 
the most attention to his critique of Judge Crabb’s opinion.170  The court 
disagreed with both Judge Crabb and the Fourth Circuit, which both 
reasoned that requiring a plaintiff to claim a tax exemption they were 
sure to be denied in order to have standing would be “futile” and a 
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“waste of time.”171  Judge Flaum wrote, “Article III ‘is not merely a 
troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the ‘merits’ 
of a lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the 
basic charter promulgated by the Framers.’”172 
The last aspect of Judge Crabb’s opinion challenged by the Seventh 
Circuit was the argument that the Supreme Court has previously ruled on 
Establishment Clause issues when it was unclear whether the plaintiff 
had met the requirements of standing.173  An example is Walz v. Tax 
Commission of the City of New York,174 where the Supreme Court found 
that religious property exemptions did not violate the Establishment 
Clause when those same tax exemptions were also available to other 
educational and charitable non-profit organizations.175  In Walz, the 
Court did not raise the issue of standing.176  The Seventh Circuit noted 
that the fact that a previous case declined to address the issue of standing 
is not a basis to determine that the plaintiff in that case actually had 
standing.177 
In the second paragraph of the opinion, Circuit Judge Flaum writes, 
“[w]e conclude that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 107(2).  
We therefore do not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the 
parsonage exemption.”178  This quote precisely demonstrates the 
difficulty that the standing issue poses upon those seeking to challenge 
the Minister’s Housing Allowance.  Because standing is so difficult to 
show, it is nearly impossible to get courts to “reach the issue” of the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance.179  This quote also represents the issue 
presented by all standing challenges—courts can use standing to decline 
to decide difficult or controversial cases.180  Here, rather than addressing 
the merits of the FFRF’s claim, the Seventh Circuit chose to rule on the 
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issue of standing and not “reach the issue of the constitutionality of the 
parsonage exemption.”181 
Based upon the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Lew, and considering 
the narrowing trend of courts’ willingness to grant taxpayer standing on 
Establishment Clause cases, it appears that the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance is currently insulated from a challenge in court.182  If courts 
refuse to rule on the issue, the only option left is for Congress to change 
the text of the statute.  Yet, it is hardly imaginable that a politician 
seeking reelection would choose to focus upon the issue of denying tax 
exemptions to ministers.  Therefore, it appears, for the time being, that 
regardless of whether or not the Minister’s Housing Allowance violates 
the Constitution of the United States, the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
will remain because it cannot be challenged in court. 
B. The Merits of the Case 
Although the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and declined 
to reach the merits of the Establishment Clause issue in Lew because of 
standing, it is the primary purpose of this Comment to show how the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance violates the Constitution.  The essential 
issue is whether a tax exemption granted exclusively to “ministers of the 
gospel” runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.  The remaining portion 
of this Comment will argue that, regardless of standing, the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance violates the Establishment Clause because (1) it does 
not have a secular purpose; (2) it can be reasonably seen as a government 
endorsement of religion; (3) it fosters excessive entanglement between 
government and religion; (4) it is not rooted in an historical tradition; and 
(5) it violates government neutrality with religion.  Although Judge 
Crabb’s analysis in Lew focused primarily on the first three factors,183 
this Comment also examines the historical test and the neutrality test to 
show that the Minister’s Housing Allowance cannot withstand any of the 
tests articulated by Supreme Court precedent. 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”184  The “Religion Clauses” of the First Amendment have 
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developed different theories and bodies of law for both the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 
To determine whether the Minister’s Housing Allowance violated 
the Establishment Clause, Judge Crabb applied a version of the Lemon 
Test.185  The Lemon Test was first articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.186  A government action violates the Establishment 
Clause if it fails any one of the three prongs of the test.187  “Under 
Lemon, government action violates the [E]stablishment [C]lause if (1) it 
has no secular purpose; (2) its primary effect advances or inhibits 
religion; or (3) it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion.”188 
Although there are many tests the Supreme Court has employed in 
religion cases, the Lemon Test is often used, and it is the test the Seventh 
Circuit applied in other cases.189  Despite how often the Lemon Test is 
used, it has received its share of criticism.190  Justice Scalia said of the 
Lemon Test that it is like: 
a ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave 
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.  [It] is 
there to scare us [when] we wish it to do so, but we can command it to 
return to the tomb at will.  When we wish to strike down a practice it 
forbids, we invoke it, when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we 
ignore it entirely.191 
In response to this criticism, in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O’Connor 
offered what is now known as the “modified Lemon Test.”192  In the 
modified Lemon Test, the Court asks (1) whether the purpose of the 
government action endorses religion and (2) whether the statute actually 
conveys a message of endorsement.193  In Lew, Judge Crabb employed 
the modified Lemon Test but examined the issues under the traditional 
Lemon Test as well.194 
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1. The Minister’s Housing Allowance Has No Secular Purpose 
The defendants in Lew argued that the purpose of the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance was to eliminate “discrimination among different 
religions and between religious and nonreligious persons.”195  
Defendants argued that Congress, in response to the Convenience of the 
Employer Doctrine (which allows employees required to live on business 
premises to exclude housing from their gross income),196 passed a 
corresponding tax code for ministers that eventually became § 107(1)—
the Parsonage Exemption.197  The exemption under § 107(1) benefits 
ministers of religious organizations that provide housing, but it is of no 
benefit to ministers whose church or organization does not provide 
housing.  Defendants argued that when Congress passed § 107(2), they 
were attempting to answer just such a question.198 
Defendants’ argument was that by passing the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance, Congress was not endorsing religion;199 instead, Congress 
was removing religious discrimination because now all ministers could 
enjoy the exemption of housing regardless of whether their employer or 
religion provided housing.200  The Minister’s Housing Allowance, 
according to the defendants, places all ministers on a level playing field. 
Judge Crabb ultimately rejected the arguments of the defendants, 
stating that the purpose of the Minister’s Housing Allowance “was to 
assist a subset of religious groups, which . . . is not a secular purpose 
under the [E]stablishment [C]lause.”201  She reasoned that the Parsonage 
Exemption discriminates against certain ministers no more than secular 
employees who purchase their own housing and are excluded from 
claiming the convenience of the employer tax exclusion.202 
Judge Crabb rejected the defendants’ argument that the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance eliminated any discriminatory effect of the 
Parsonage Exemption.203  “[T]o the extent that § 107(1) discriminates 
among religions, § 107(2) does not eliminate that discrimination but 
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merely shifts it.”204  Here the court relied on Erwin Chemerinksy,205 the 
founding Dean at the University of California, Irvine School of Law and 
considered an expert in the field of constitutional law.206  In his 2003 
article, Chemerinsky argues that the Minister’s Housing Allowance in  
§ 107(2) discriminates against those religions that do not have clergy.207  
“[S]ection § 107(2) . . . offers a huge financial benefit to those religions 
and churches that have clergy as compared to those which do not.”208  
Furthermore, Chemerinsky argues that the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance discriminates in other ways as well.209  He argues that the 
exemption discriminates against new religions which may not be 
“affiliated with a national church or which do not have a history of 
ordaining ministers.”210 
Chemerinsky’s critique of the lack of secular purpose in § 107(2) 
does not stop there; Chemerinsky notes that the IRS tax guide for 
churches “discriminates among clergy based on the specific tasks they 
are performing.”211  The tax guide has certain criteria that a minister has 
to meet in order to claim the tax exclusion.212  As explained above, tax 
courts have noted five factors considered in determining whether a 
person is a “minister of the gospel.”213  Therefore, a minister who 
performs services for his church may be unable to claim the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance if he does not perform sacerdotal functions or 
conduct worship services (or meet the other criteria of the test).214 
For example, consider a minister whose primary responsibility is 
counseling and is employed by a very large church with a large staff.  
The counseling minister counsels on a daily basis, but the minister never 
performs sacerdotal functions in a Sunday service, such as baptism or 
communion.  The minister never preaches or leads the congregation, and 
unless the individual members go to counseling, the members might not 
know anything about the minister.  Such a counseling minister, although 
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their services are essential to the church, would not meet the criteria of a 
“minister of the gospel.”215  Such an example is why Chemerinsky 
reasons that the Minister’s Housing Allowance “discriminates against 
religions in so many ways that it undermines any claim that it is justified 
as a way of treating religions equally.”216 
Under Judge Crabb’s reasoning, even if the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance cured any discrimination within religious groups, the statute 
would still violate the Establishment Clause because “the provision 
applies to religious persons only.”217  The court noted the facial lack of a 
secular purpose, stating that “[a] desire to assist disadvantaged churches 
and ministers is not a secular purpose and it does not produce a secular 
effect when similarly disadvantaged secular organizations and employees 
are excluded from the benefit.”218 
Defendants argued that other provisions in the tax code granting 
exemptions to other nonreligious groups justified the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance.219  Defendants noted exclusions for members of the military, 
citizens who live abroad, and federal employees who live abroad.220  
Citing Texas Monthly,221 the court noted that an exemption that was 
granted to a wide range of nonreligious groups could survive a 
constitutional challenge, but it was not enough to point to a “small 
number of secular groups” to survive a constitutional challenge.222 
Ultimately, Judge Crabb ruled that the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance did not have a secular purpose; rather, the statute would 
appear to the “reasonable observer” to be an endorsement of religion.223  
Although case law is limited on this issue, the district court’s reasoning 
in Lew corresponds with other decisions that partially address similar 
issues.224 
In a 2014 case in the Eastern District of Kentucky, plaintiffs filed 
suit challenging the Minister’s Housing Allowance.225  Ultimately, the 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing, but the court 
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noted that a challenge to the Minister’s Housing Allowance is at least 
plausible enough to successfully survive a motion to dismiss.226  This 
means that the plaintiffs had established a plausible claim for which 
relief could be granted.227 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New 
York is perhaps the most helpful case in examining the secular purpose 
and effects of the Minister’s Housing Allowance.228  The Court in Walz 
upheld a New York statute granting tax exemptions to churches because 
the exemption was also available to nonreligious charities and 
nonprofits.229  The Walz Court gave a lengthy and useful analysis of the 
original intent of the Religious Clauses in the First Amendment.230 
Writing in Walz, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that maintaining a 
separation between promotion of religion and neutrality is difficult 
because the “very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of 
sorts.”231  Burger also noted that granting tax exemptions for churches is 
an “unbroken practice” from the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights 
was written and those exemptions are “not something to be lightly cast 
aside.”232  The Court’s reliance on a long legislative history seems, at 
first, to favor the view that the Minister’s Housing Allowance does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.  If the nation has a long history of 
granting tax exemptions to religious organizations, then extending those 
exemptions to the leaders of those organizations may be justified as well. 
However, this reasoning can quickly be dispelled by examining the 
legislative history of the Minister’s Housing Allowance.  While tax 
exemptions for religious organizations can trace its roots back centuries, 
tax exemptions for ministers is a relatively recent inclusion into the 
law.233  First, the Minister’s Housing Allowance was not included in the 
tax code until 1954.234 Second, Representative Mack’s statements that 
the law should be passed for those “who are caring for our spiritual 
welfare” during “times when we are being threatened by a godless and 
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anti-religious world movement” are important to understand Congress’s 
purpose for enacting § 107(2).235  Given these statements, it seems that 
the congressional intent of § 107(2) was to promote and endorse religion.  
According to Burger, the legislative purpose for an act must be “neither 
the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship 
nor hostility.”236 
Leaning on Burger’s analysis in Walz, the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance violates the Establishment Clause because it lacks a secular 
purpose.  The legislative history is quite clear that the intent of Congress 
was to advance, or at least, endorse religion.  Applying the modified 
Lemon Test, the Minister’s Housing Allowance has no secular purpose 
and it conveys an actual message of endorsement to the general 
observer.237 
2. The Effect of the Minister’s Housing Allowance Endorses Religion 
The second prong of the modified Lemon Test requires that a law 
must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion to 
withstand an Establishment Clause challenge.238  In Texas Monthly, Inc. 
v. Bullock, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether state 
tax exemptions for religious periodicals violated the Establishment 
Clause.239  The Texas law exempted “‘[p]eriodicals that are published or 
distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings 
promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of 
writings sacred to a religious faith.’”240  As is clear from the text of the 
statute, the exemption was exclusively granted to religious 
publications.241  Texas Monthly was a general interest magazine that was 
not exclusively a religious magazine.242  In a plurality opinion, the Court 
ultimately decided, “when confined exclusively to publications 
advancing the tenets of a religious faith, the exemption runs afoul of the 
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Establishment Clause . . . .”243  The Court in Texas Monthly addressed a 
few aspects that had an important bearing upon the decision in Lew. 
First, the Court noted the difficulty in avoiding overlap between 
government interests and those of religious interests: 
The nonsectarian aims of government and the interests of religious 
groups often overlap, and this Court has never required that public 
authorities refrain from implementing reasonable measures to advance 
legitimate secular goals merely because they would thereby relieve 
religious groups of costs they would otherwise incur.244 
Effectively, the Court noted that government policies that incidentally 
benefit religion are not automatically invalid.245  The Court went on to 
hold that tax benefits enjoyed by religious organizations do not violate 
the Establishment Clause if such benefits also “flow[] to a large number 
of nonreligious groups as well.”246 
Secondly, the Court addressed whether there was a real difference 
between a tax subsidy and a tax exemption.247  The Court stated, “[e]very 
tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, 
forcing them to become ‘indirect and vicarious donors.’”248  The court in 
Lew relied upon this reasoning.249  The Court in Texas Monthly noted 
that exemptions act as a subsidy and when the government subsidizes a 
religious group via an exemption this will often be viewed as endorsing 
religion or a religious group.250 
Judge Crabb relied heavily upon Texas Monthly in Lew because it is 
one of the few existing cases nearly on point.251  The Minister’s Housing 
Allowance is comparable to the Texas tax exemption because both are 
only available to religious persons or entities.  Applying the rationale 
from Texas Monthly, it is clear that the Minister’s Housing Allowance 
has the effect of endorsing religion “because the exemption provides a 
benefit to religious persons and no one else.”252  If the effect of the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance endorses religion, then the tax exemption 
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violates the Establishment Clause.253  However, if the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance were available to other non-religious persons, such as 
directors of non-profit organizations, then, under Walz, the Allowance 
would not run afoul of the Constitution.  But this is not the case.  
Because the Minister’s Housing Allowance is granted solely to religious 
persons, the Allowance has the effect of endorsing religion and violates 
the Establishment Clause. 
3. The Minister’s Housing Allowance Fosters Excessive Entanglement 
Although Judge Crabb relied on the two factors in the modified 
Lemon Test, she also used the third factor of the original Lemon Test, 
which finds a law unconstitutional if it fosters excessive entanglement 
between church and state.254  The Court noted that Texas Monthly was a 
closely analogous case.255  The Court in Texas Monthly held that the 
Texas law granting tax exemptions exclusively to religious publications 
fostered excessive entanglement because it required the government to 
“evaluat[e] the relative merits of differing religious claims.”256 
The Minister’s Housing Allowance necessarily requires this 
evaluation of relative merits because it is not easily discernable who is a 
“minister of the gospel” according to the plain text of § 107(2).  The 
courts have developed a five factor test to determine whether a person is 
a minister and able to claim the exclusion under 107(2).257  The factors 
are whether the individual: 
(1) performs sacerdotal functions under the tenets and practices of the 
particular religious body constituting his church or denomination, (2) 
conducts worship services, (3) performs services in the control, 
conduct, and maintenance of a religious organization, (4) is ordained, 
commissioned, or licensed, and (5) is considered to be a spiritual leader 
by his religious body.258 
Similar factors are set forth in the Tax Regulations.259 
Because of Congress’s failure to define “minister of the gospel” in  
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§ 107, all three branches of the government become entangled in 
religion.  First, Congress grants the exemption that is codified in § 107.  
Because of the ambiguity of the exemption, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) must determine who qualifies as a minister of the gospel.260  The 
IRS is an extension of the executive branch tasked with “interpreting, 
administering, and enforcing the federal tax statutes.”261  Therefore, from 
the outset, both the executive and legislative branches of government are 
entangled in religion because the executive is now tasked with 
interpreting and enforcing the legislation exempting an ambiguous class 
of citizens based on religion. 
However, because disputes arise while interpreting who qualifies as 
a “minister of the gospel,” the judicial branch must decide these disputes.  
Judges must look at the actions of the individual and the tenets and 
practices of the religious organization to determine whether the 
individual qualifies for the exemption.262  The determination of whether a 
person is a minister of the gospel is a fact and circumstances analysis, 
which looks to the type and characterization of the organization in 
combination with the nature of the ministerial duties.263  The 
complications of this fact-intensive analysis are clear from Lew and 
another case where the Tax Court was seeking to define “minister of the 
gospel.”264  In Knight v. Commissioner, the court considered whether the 
taxpayer who was licensed but not ordained as a minister was eligible for 
a tax exclusion for his ministerial wages.265  The Knight court examined 
the constitution of the religious denomination and weighed the duties and 
services of the taxpayer, and ultimately the court determined that 
although the taxpayer did not meet all five factors, his work could be 
classified as a minister.266  Certainly there is an entanglement issue when 
the government is examining a denomination’s constitution as well as 
looking at the daily services performed by one of its ministers. 
Judge Crabb stopped short of making a determination about whether 
the Parsonage Exemption fostered excessive entanglement,267 but the 
court’s brief treatment of the subject as well as an examination of Knight 
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certainly leans heavily in favor of a finding of excessive entanglement.268  
Due to the unclear language of “ministers of the gospel,” both the 
executive branch (through the IRS) and the judiciary (through the courts) 
become entangled in religion because of the fact-intensive determination 
required in each applicant’s case. 
After examining the various prongs of the Lemon Test, it is clear that 
the Minister’s Housing Allowance violates the Establishment Clause.  A 
law violates the Establishment Clause if it fails any prong of the test.269  
The Minister’s Housing Allowance fails the modified Lemon Test 
because the legislative history is clear that the purpose of the exemption 
was to endorse religion, and the message of endorsement is clear to a 
reasonable observer.270 
The Minister’s Housing Allowance also fails the third prong of the 
original Lemon Test because it fosters excessive government 
entanglement with religion by requiring the IRS and the courts to 
examine ministers’ daily duties as well as religious by-laws of particular 
denominations.271  Therefore, regardless of what version of the Lemon 
Test is applied to the Minister’s Housing Allowance, the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance violates the Establishment Clause. 
4. The Minister’s Housing Allowance Fails the Historical Test 
Besides the Lemon Test, the Supreme Court has employed other tests 
in Establishment Clause cases.  One of these tests is the historical test.  
Under the historical test, a government action may survive an 
Establishment Clause challenge if it is rooted in an historical tradition.272 
In a 2014 case, Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling that a prayer before a town’s board 
meetings violated the Establishment Clause.273  Justice Kennedy, writing 
for a majority, stated that the prayers before the town’s board meetings 
did “not fall outside the tradition this Court has recognized.”274 
Although the issue in Town of Greece was prayer, the case could 
prove to be a strong support for the tax issue in Lew.  In Town of Greece, 
a New York town supervisor decided in 1999 to begin town board 
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meetings by inviting members of the local clergy to deliver an 
invocation.275  The district court ruled in favor of the town, finding that 
the prayer did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.276  The Second 
Circuit reversed, holding that “aspects of the prayer program, viewed in 
their totality by a reasonable observer, conveyed the message that Greece 
was endorsing Christianity.”277  The issue, as framed by the Supreme 
Court, was “whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within 
the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”278 
The Court relied on their decision in Marsh v. Chambers, which held 
that applying other tests usually applied in Establishment Clause cases 
was “unnecessary because history supported the conclusion that 
legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause.”279  
In Town of Greece, the Court looked at the long history of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer.280  The Court noted that prayer before 
legislative meetings can trace its history back to at least the first 
Congress.281 
Justice Kennedy, relying on Marsh, stated “it is not necessary to 
define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history 
shows that the specific practice is permitted.”282  Kennedy held that the 
prayers before the town’s meetings “[did] not fall outside the tradition 
this Court has recognized.”283  Kennedy later wrote: 
The prayer opportunity in this case must be evaluated against the 
backdrop of historical practice.  As a practice that has long endured, 
legislative prayer has become part of our heritage and tradition, part of 
our expressive idiom, similar to the Pledge of Allegiance, inaugural 
prayer; or the recitation of ‘God save the United States and this 
honorable Court’ at the opening of [the Supreme] Court’s sessions.284 
Although Lew is not a case about prayer before legislative sessions, 
and though the tax exemptions granted to individual ministers under  
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§ 107(2) cannot be traced back to the founding fathers, the argument can 
certainly be made that tax benefits granted on the basis of religion have 
roots that can be traced back to the Founding Fathers.285  As the Court 
noted in Walz, Congress has recognized real estate tax exemptions for 
religious bodies tracing back to the “earliest days” of the Constitution.286  
The Walz Court noted a number of historical tax exemptions for religious 
organizations for both real and personal property.287  However, the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance is a federal income tax exemption, and 
tax exemptions from federal income taxes do not have an historical and 
rooted tradition.288 
The federal income tax was first promulgated in 1913, and the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance was not a part of the original tax code.289  
As noted above, defendants in Lew argued that the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance was enacted in order to cure discrimination between religions 
created by the Parsonage Exemption.290  Under this argument, the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance seeks to protect the traditional property 
exemption recognized in the early years of the nation by allowing 
ministers to exempt their housing even if that housing is not owned by 
the religious institution and provided to the minister as part of their 
compensation. 
Using the argument that the Allowance is a slight variation on the 
traditional practice of tax exemptions for religions for real property, it is 
possible to draw analogies to Town of Greece.  Like the prayer in Town 
of Greece, the exemption in § 107(2) is available to all religions and not 
reserved exclusively for Christian ministers.291  City officials in Town of 
Greece stated that atheists could lead the town meeting invocations.292  
Defendants in Lew argued that plaintiffs’ claim of atheism did not 
disqualify them from the exemption.293  But once again, FFRF was not 
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arguing that the Minister’s Housing Allowance discriminated against 
them as atheists; rather, the FFRF was arguing that the discrimination 
was linked to their inability as employees of a non-profit to benefit from 
a tax exemption that was only granted on the basis of religion.294 
Ultimately, the Minister’s Housing Allowance fails the historical 
test.  Although property tax exemptions for religious organizations can 
be rooted in an historical tradition, there is no historical tradition that 
clearly shows ministers can deduct from their income portions of their 
salary that is used for housing.  Because there is no tradition of ministers 
being exempt from federal income taxes, the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance fails the historical test. 
5. The Minister’s Housing Allowance Fails the Neutrality Test 
Another test applied by the Supreme Court that is favored by some 
justices is the neutrality test.295  In Mitchell v. Helms, the issue before the 
Court was whether federal funds that were distributed to state and local 
government agencies and then distributed to public and private schools 
violated the Establishment Clause when some of the private schools 
receiving funds were religiously affiliated.296 
Justice Thomas, joined by three other justices, wrote that “[W]e have 
consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is 
offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their 
religion.”297  The court went on to state that government aid does not 
violate the Establishment Clause when aid “is allocated on the basis of 
neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is 
made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.”298 
To apply the neutrality test as stated in Mitchell v. Helms to the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance, the issue becomes whether the tax 
exemption granted to “ministers of the gospel” is: (1) granted on the 
basis of neutral, secular criteria; (2) neither favors nor disfavors religion; 
and (3) is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries.299 
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The Minister’s Housing Allowance is not granted on the basis of 
neutral, secular criteria.  First, the exemption can only be claimed by 
employees of a religious organization, which excludes secular employees 
right from the start.  Determining whether a person is a “minister of the 
gospel” requires looking at the tenets and practices of the religion as well 
as the performance of other sacerdotal functions.300 
The Minister’s Housing Allowance also favors religion because it is 
an exclusive exemption for “ministers of the gospel.”  Unlike the 
Parsonage Exemption that has a corresponding exemption available to 
employees of non-religious organizations, the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance has no corresponding secular tax exemption.301 
For the above reasons, the Minister’s Housing Allowance fails the 
neutrality test because: (1) it is not granted on the basis of neutral, 
secular criteria; (2) it favors religion; and (3) it is not available to both 
secular and religious beneficiaries.  On its face the exemption is available 
only to “ministers of the gospel.”302 
C. The Future and Implications of The Minister’s Housing Allowance 
Although the district court ultimately found the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance to be in violation of the Establishment Clause in Lew, the 
court left open the possibility that the law could be re-written in such a 
way to pass constitutional muster.303  The primary fault in § 107(2) is that 
it applies exclusively to “ministers of the gospel.”  If the exclusion was 
expanded to include other nonreligious beneficiaries, the law could 
survive even though it also benefits religious groups.  Such an expansion 
would have a few profound results. 
First, the Parsonage Exemption is a perfect example of how an 
expansion of the Minister’s Housing Allowance could benefit 
nonreligious persons while preserving the exemption for ministers.  The 
Parsonage Exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause because 
there is a corresponding tax provision in the tax code granting exclusions 
for employees who are provided housing from non-religious 
employers.304  If Congress wished to change the tax code so the 
Minister’s Housing Allowance does not violate the Establishment 
                                                          
 300.  See Knight v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 199, 204 (1989). 
 301.  See supra Section II.A. 
 302.  Treas. Reg. § 107(2) (2014). 
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Clause, it could create a corresponding tax provision for non-religious 
employees that would eliminate any discrimination and any endorsement 
of religion. 
Second, such a provision could profoundly benefit non-profit 
organizations.  If employees of non-profits were able to exclude their 
housing from their gross income, non-profits would be able to be more 
competitive in their hiring decisions and potentially bring on higher 
caliber employees whose lower salary from the non-profit would be 
offset by the tax exclusion.  A tax exclusion extended to non-profits 
would also allow non-profits to lower their salaries offered to employees 
because the money saved by the exclusion would offset the reduction in 
salary.  This would free up more funds for non-profits to spend directly 
on programs that benefit the general welfare. 
And finally, one of the problems with the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance as it stands today is that it can be abused.  It can be abused by 
ministers who are receiving high levels of income and exempting from 
their income the rentals and mortgages for extravagant housing.305  It can 
also be abused at a lower level of income.  Churches can offer extremely 
low salaries to ministers and justify these lower salaries because the 
minister can exclude his mortgage or rent from his income. 
Regardless of possible abuses, an expansion of the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance to include other directors of non-profits could have a 
positive impact upon the ability of these non-profits to further their 
missions as well as maintain the Minister’s Housing Allowance for 
ministers who are dependent upon the tax exclusion for their financial 
survival. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Seventh Circuit ultimately reversed the district court on 
the issue of standing, it appears that the plaintiffs in Lew came as close as 
a plaintiff can come in establishing standing to challenge the Minister’s 
Housing Allowance.  Plaintiffs Barker and Gaylor were employed by a 
non-profit organization and portions of their salaries were designated as a 
housing allowance.306  Although Barker and Gaylor appear similarly 
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situated to ministers, the Seventh Circuit concluded that since they did 
not claim the exemption, they did not suffer an actual injury.307 
Yet, the Minister’s Housing Allowance appears to violate the 
Establishment Clause because: (1) it does not have a secular purpose; (2) 
it can be reasonably seen as a government endorsement of religion; (3) it 
fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion; (4) it 
is not rooted in an historical tradition; and (5) it violates government 
neutrality with religion.  Ultimately, it must be concluded that, for the 
time being, the Minister’s Housing Allowance is a political question.  If 
plaintiffs cannot establish standing to challenge the Allowance, then the 
Allowance will remain unchanged unless Congress determines 
otherwise—a result that is extremely unlikely. 
Although this Comment argues that the Minister’s Housing 
Allowance is unconstitutional, it is not meant to be an assault on religion.  
As Judge Crabb stated in Lew, “Some might view a rule against 
preferential treatment as exhibiting hostility toward religion, but equality 
should never be mistaken for hostility.”308 
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